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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
ADA VEE MEDLIN ) BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ) 
v. ) Appellate Case No. 93 0040-CA 
JAMES BYRON MEDLIN ) Appellate Court No. 924900335 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the Trial Court properly exercised its discretionary power in making 
its award of alimony. 
2. Whether the Record was sufficient to support the Trial Court's Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. 
3. Whether the Trial Court properly exercised its discretionary power to make its 
division of property. 
4. Whether the Record was sufficient to support the Trial Court's property 
1 
division. 
5. Whether the Record was sufficient to support the Trial Court's award of 
attorney's fees. 
6. Whether the Record was sufficient to support the Trial Court's valuation of the 
law practice and marital business. 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1989); Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1991); Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Trial in this matter was heard on October 14, 19, and 26, of 1992, before the 
Honorable Leslie M. Lewis of the Third District Court. The Appellee/Plaintiff (herein 
generally referred to as the "Plaintiff), Vee Medlin, was represented by attorney, Kathleen 
McConkie. Appellant/Defendant, an attorney himself, (herein generally referred to as the 
"Defendant"), James B. Medlin, appeared Pro Se. After hearing the evidence and making 
partial findings the court ordered the parties to prepare and submit proposed findings. 
Defendant failed to submit any proposed findings. After considering the Plaintiffs proposed 
Findings and the Objections thereto by Defendant, the Court entered its Findings & 
Conclusions, based in part upon those submitted by the Plaintiff, and entered its Decree of 
Divorce. Defendant appeals from this judgment. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The parties in this case were married for over 38 years. During that time, the Plaintiff 
worked to put her husband through law school, sacrificed a career, bore Defendant three 
children, took care of the home, created the products produced by Word Making Productions 
(a business which was mostly created and developed by Plaintiff and which now produces 
a small royalty) despite debilitating health problems and endured the Defendant's mental 
cruelty (including an illicit affair by the Defendant with his secretary to whom he gave an 
interest in the parties business). Besides being mentally abusive and committing adultery 
during the course of the parties marriage, the Defendant was deceitful, duplicitous and 
engaged in unethical and illegal business practices. Defendant also violated court orders in 
an apparent attempt to hide assets and avoid the payment of alimony. 
Defendant's pattern of deceit, misrepresentation and duplicity carried over into trial 
and, together with the lifelong pattern described, had the effect of making it impossible to 
determine at trial either the actual amount of Defendant's income during the course of the 
marriage or his current assets. It was clear, however, that the sums earned by the Defendant 
were substantially above what he actually reported or claimed to have earned. However, the 
Court was able to ascertain that of the two parties, the Defendant was and is able to engage 
in gainful employment, while the Plaintiff was not. 
Because of the Defendant's own deliberate, not credible and misleading testimony 
regarding his assets and income, his ability to earn a substantial income, the length of the 
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marriage and the Plaintiffs extremely poor health, financial condition and needs, it was 
appropriate for the Court to make the property and alimony awards that it did. Indeed, the 
Court has decided in the only way possible given Defendant's attempt to hide his income and 
assets. As a result, the Court has not abused its discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
I The Court Award of Alimony Is Discretionary and Proper Where Defendant 
Has Made It Impossible to Determine His Income and the Plaintiff Is Not Able 
to Provide for Herself. 
In a divorce action the "trial court is permitted considerable discretion in adjusting 
financial and property interests of parties and its actions are entitled to a presumption of 
validity." Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1203 at p. 1203 (Utah 1983). The judgment of the 
trial court, therefore, will not be overturned "absent [a] showing of abuse of discretion." 
Bushell v. Bushell 649 P.2d 85 (Utah 1982). It is the burden of the Appellant to show that 
the "evidence clearly preponderates against findings of the court, or there has be a 
misapplication of the law, or the court has clearly abused its discretion." Adams v. Adams, 
751 P.2d 1149 at p. 147 (Utah 1979). 
In making its decision, the Trial Court is to consider three factors: the "receiving 
spouse's financial condition and needs; receiving spouse's ability to earn adequate income; and 
providing spouse's ability to provide support." Newmeyerv. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 at 
p. 1276 (Utah 1987); Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 at p. 97 (Utah 1986). The "[p]urpose of 
alimony is to provide support for the wife as nearly as possible at the standard of living she 
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enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent her from becoming a public charge; this calls for 
determining financial condition and needs of the wife, her ability to procure a sufficient 
income for herself and [her] husband's ability to provide support." Georgedes v. Georgedes, 
627 P.2d 44 at p. 44 (Utah 1981). To make its determination the Court may consider other 
factors that bear on these issues, such as the fault of the parties; length of the marriage (Boyle 
v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1987); advance degree or professional license (Rayburn 
v. Ray burn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1987); which spouse helped to finance the degree 
(Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987); what the parties gave up during the 
marriage; the health of the parties; etc. The factors upon which the Trial Court relied in this 
case were substantial and supported by the record. 
A. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Are Sufficient to 
Support the Trial Court's Award of Alimony. 
The Defendant does not contend that the evidence and findings do not support the fact 
that the Plaintiffs financial condition and needs, as well as her inability to produce an income 
for herself, make alimony appropriate. Indeed, Defendant points out the need and inability 
while selectively omitting the part of the findings that indicate the severity of that need and 
inability. Findings of Fact, at 11. 
Rather, Defendant disputes the adequacy of the Court's findings as to the ability of 
Defendant to provide the support. The Brief of Appellant quotes Finding of Fact 13 (at 
Record page no. 387), to wit: "The court finds that Defendant is either unable or unwilling 
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to pay monthly alimony." The Brief then states: "It is in this finding or lack or other 
sufficient findings that the Court errs." It goes on to say: 
The Court failed, however, to enter adequate findings as to the 
ability of the paying spouse to provide support. All the Court 
finds in this regard is that he is unable or unwilling to pay 
monthly alimony. . . . There is no finding with regard to 
respondents [sic] income except that he has generated an 
unknown amount of income from his law practice, that he has 
marketable skills to earn a living and that he can use those 
skills to live a life close to the standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage. . . The Court has reached a conclusion 
not supported by facts. (Emphasis added.) 
(Brief of Appellant at 11-12.) 
Here again, Defendant has selectively omitted to identify on appeal those findings by 
the Trial Court that "reveal the steps the court took to reach its conclusion on [the] factual 
issue presented." Sampinos v. Scanpinos, 750 P.2d 615 (Utah 1988); Stevens v. Stevens, ISA 
P.2d 952 (Utah 1988). 
The Trial Court also found as follows: 
1. The Defendant "appears to be in, good health, 
. . . very able-bodied and capable of contributing to his own support and the 
support of plaintiff." 
2. The Defendant has "worked throughout the marriage, 
practicing law and has generated a significant but unknown amount of income 
from the practice. That, based upon the testimony, it is clear defendant has 
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under-valued and misrepresented his law practice income. Defendant has 
marketable skills to earn a living and can use these to live a life close to the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage." (Emphasis added.) 
3. "The Court finds the defendant is not credible on valuing 
any of the above assets or as to his own income from the practice of law." 
(Emphasis added.) 
4. "The Court finds from all of the testimony, including 
defendant's, that the defendant has made significant income from the practice 
of law and has ' commingled' these finds [sic] with Word Making income and 
has consistently failed to fully reflect this income on tax returns and it cannot 
now be fully and accurately determined." 
5. "The Court finds defendant will soon be eligible to earn 
social security benefits of $719.00 a month and has testified he may or may 
not retire." 
Findings of Fact, at 4-6 (See Findings of Fact No. 12, 16, 19, 20 & 21, respectively). 
These findings were amply supported by the trial record. Indeed, as to the income of 
Defendant, the only expert testimony offered was that of a CPA who, after thoroughly 
reviewing Defendant's available records, testified on behalf of Plaintiff that because 
Defendant had not reported income and/or commingled funds, it was not possible to 
determine the exact income of Defendant. See generally, Record at 12-150. The requirement 
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of adequate findings should not be construed so as to require the Trial Court to reproduce 
three days of testimony and the supporting exhibits; rather it requires only enough facts to 
"reveal the steps the court took to reach its conclusion". Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 P.2d 
615 (Utah 1988). As pointed out above, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that in setting 
alimony the trial court "must make sufficient findings to demonstrate that it considered the 
financial condition and needs of the party seeking alimony, that party's ability to produce 
sufficient income, and the ability of other party to provide support." Noble v. Noble, 761 
P.2d 1369 at p. 1369(Utah 1988). The Trial Court made sufficient findings when it stated 
the general reasons for its findings with enough specifics to enable this appellate court to 
verify its findings and conclusions in the trial record. 
The trial record confirms the above, including that the Defendant is able to contribute 
to his own support and that of the Plaintiff. For example, the Defendant stated at trial he 
was planning of retiring. This claim was made in an effort to support his claim that he 
could not afford to pay alimony. The assertion was, however, directly rebutted by a letter 
he wrote to the Nebraska Bar in which he inquired about the possibility of obtaining a license 
for the purpose of practicing law. Id. at 179-184. In the letter, however, he specifically 
asked the Nebraska Bar not to say anything to his wife as he was going through a divorce 
at the time. Id. at 180-181. In addition, testimony at trial indicated that he had received 
large sums through his practice of law, and by other means, in spite of his testimony that he 
received only small amounts. Id. at 150. 
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The Defendant also engaged in practices that made it impossible to determine how 
much he actually earned in his practice of law. Evidence at trial showed, however, that the 
amounts he earned were substantially in excess of what he claimed (i.e. a $45,000 legal fee 
from a single client). Record at vol I, 150, 152; vol III at 77. The Defendant commingled 
the funds of his law practice with those of Word Making. Id. at vol. I, 87, 108, 120, 146, 
173-175, 192-193. He did not report substantial amounts of income. Id. at vol. I, 143-145; 
vol II, 53-59. He misappropriated property, without the Plaintiffs knowledge, belonging to 
Word Making (a business that produced products to help children learn to read) and directed 
it into improper loans and pornographic films. Id. at vol. I, 145-145, 159, 163. He 
discontinued Plaintiffs insurance (despite her extremely poor health), leaving her uninsurable, 
claiming lack of funds, although he was able to purchase a satellite dish, VCR and other 
items for his office, as well as pay for medical bills of his mistress1 (Id. 35) children. Id. at 
vol I, 172. He engaged in illegal conduct for financial gain by having a friend sell his boat 
and then claiming it as stolen to collect the insurance money. Id. at vol. II, 58. And he 
disobeyed Court orders regarding the assets of Word making. Record at vol. II at 107. 
Additionally, although ordered by the Court to pay temporary alimony (amounting to 
approximately $15,000.00), Defendant failed to make any temporary alimony payments 
whatsoever. Findings of Fact, at 12. 
All of these acts (together with others found in the record) constituted bad faith on the 
part of the Defendant and made it impossible for the Trial Court to make an accurate 
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determination as to the Defendant's income. 
The Trial Court is not required to make a specific finding as to the Defendant's 
income, but could determine that he was either earning more than the evidence indicated or 
had the ability to earn more money. See, Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530, 534 
(Utah App. 1990). In Osguthorpe the Appellate Court noted that the Trial Court found the 
Defendant to be unreliable as a witness, the Appellate Court therefore deferred "to the trial 
courts's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. Id. As the Utah Court of Appeals 
noted in Boyle, "[t]he trial court is clearly in the best position to weigh the evidence, 
determine credibility and arrive at factual conclusions." Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d at 670. 
In this case, the Trial Court, after weighing the evidence, found the Appellant not to be a 
credible witness. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also held lump-sum alimony to be proper and within the 
discretion of the Trial Court where the "husband's repeated lack of cooperation in divorce 
proceedings and his refusal to pay temporary alimony ordered by the court . . . indicated 
likelihood that [wife] would have great difficulty in collecting periodic alimony payments." 
Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1984). Defendant's actions throughout his marriage 
and the divorce proceedings make it clear that the Plaintiff would probably "have great 
difficulty in collecting periodic alimony payments." 
It would be unjust, as well as against the evidence, to allow the Defendant to reap the 
benefits of his dishonest conduct simply because those deliberate actions made it impossible 
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for the Trial Court to make a "specific finding as to how much James makes on a monthly 
basis . . . ." Brief of Appellant, at 12. 
B. The Court's Award of Marital Property as Alimony was Proper. 
Defendant's contention that an award of marital property as alimony constitutes error 
on the part of the court is clearly erroneous. Such property awards are specifically allowed 
by statute and case law. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1991), Beds v. Beds, 682 P.2d 862 
(Utah 1984); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987). Defendant further 
contends that the trial Court's findings are "conclusory and contradictory" because the court 
found the Defendant "was either unwilling or unable to pay alimony and yet [found] that he 
has generated a significant but unknown amount of income from his law practice." Brief of 
Appellant, p. 13-14. As shown above, the Court's conclusion is completely consistent with 
the evidence presented at trial, and a more specific statement was impossible due to the 
Defendant's own purposeful misrepresentations. 
Where one of the parties engages in such behavior and refuses to cooperate in the 
divorce proceedings, "an award of lump sum alimony [is] within the trial court's discretion." 
Beds v. Beds, 682 P.2d 862 (Utah 1984). 
Defendant also complains that the court did not make a specific finding as to what his 
standard of living and living expenses are. Brief of Appellant, at 14. As pointed out above, 
however, it was the Defendant's own actions that made it impossible for a CPA, qualified as 
an expert, and the Trial Court to determine the Defendant's actual net worth and income. See 
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generally, Record at 12-150. It was determined that substantial sums were misappropriated 
and/or not reported. Record at vol. I, 50-52, 108-113. Where the court is unable to 
determine the actual amount of assets and income due to a party's bad faith, it is appropriate 
to make an award that will protect the innocent party. See, 24 Am. Jur. 2d § 940 (1983). 
Defendant's actions have been such that a division of property as proposed by Defendant 
would leave the Plaintiff financially destitute and unable to support herself or pay for her 
health care expenses, while the Defendant is fully capable of earning a living. 
DL The Property Division Made by the Court was Proper, Where the Fault Of The 
Defendant Made It Impossible For The Court To Determine His Income And 
The Plaintiff Was Not Able To Provide For Herself. 
Defendant contends further that the division of property is not equitable, and seeks to 
have the appellate court disregard the only credible evidence offered on value of the assets 
and determine that the Trial Court abused its discretion under the circumstances. 
The division of property made by the Trial Court was fair and equitable given the 
conduct of the Defendant. (See discussion above.) Evidence produced at trial indicated that 
the Defendant had routinely understated his income, had mismanaged and misappropriated 
funds of the business Plaintiff was mostly responsible for creating and developing early in 
the marriage, had failed to keep adequate records, had depleted retirement benefits, had 
canceled Plaintiffs insurance, and had misrepresented these facts to the Trial Court. The 
Evidence further indicated that it was not possible to make an accurate evaluation of 
Defendant's assets and earning capacity, due to his actions. However, it was clear that 
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substantial amounts of income had come into his possession and were no longer to be found. 
The Court took evidence on the value of the assets from a qualified expert and further 
found that the Defendant was "not credible on valuing any of the above assets or as to his 
own income from the practice of law." Findings of Fact, no. 19 at 6. Accordingly, the only 
credible evidence was that offered by the expert. 
The basic rule as to division of property between spouses is that the court should 
make such order in relation to the property as may be equitable. Bushell v. Bushell, 649 P.2d 
85, 87 (Utah 1982), citing Hamilton v. Hamilton, 562 P.2d 235 (Utah 1977). Defendant 
would have this court not only disregard his conduct but also the only credible evidence on 
value of the assets, and in turn reward him for his unethical and obstructive behavior by 
overturning the Trial Court's division of property. Equity demands otherwise! 
The Trial Court is "permitted considerable discretion in adjusting financial and 
property interests of parties and its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity." Savage 
v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983); Gill v. Gill, 718 P.2d 779 (Utah 1986). The Trial 
Court properly made a finding based upon the appropriate circumstances and its decision is 
entitled to a presumption of validity. Given the circumstances of this case, especially the 
egregious acts of the Defendant, there has been no abuse of that discretion. 
13 
ffl. The Court Property Ordered Defendant To Pay For Plaintiffs Attorney Fees 
Where Defendant Made It Impossible For The Court To Determine His 
Income, Where Defendant Violated Court Orders, Where Plaintiff Is Not Able 
To Gain Employment, And Where The Award Is Authorized By Statute. 
Attorney fees are specifically provided for by statute. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 
(1989). In a divorce case, there must evidence of need and reasonableness of the amount. 
Newmeyerv. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987); Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862 at p. 864 
(Utah 1984). The M[r]elevant factors of reasonableness include 'the necessity of the number 
of hours dedicated, the reasonableness of the rate charged in light of the difficulty of the case 
and the result accomplished, and the rates commonly charged for divorce actions in the 
community.,,, Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1984), citing, Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 
1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1980). In the present case, the need is clearly present. The Plaintiff 
has no income, is unable to work, is in poor health, and has significant expenses. Record at 
Findings of Fact, at 2-4. The Defendant on the other hand is capable of earning a living, and 
was engaged in the practice of law. Findings of Fact, at 4-5. Further, the Defendant has 
engaged in unethical, even illegal conduct, that has resulted in large amounts of money being 
secreted from the Plaintiffs control and which necessitated a considerable amount of extra 
legal work. As a result, the costs of litigation were increased — due directly to the 
Defendant's actions and not those of the Plaintiff. The Trial Court specifically found that the 
amounts sought by the Plaintiff were reasonable and not excessive. Findings of Fact, at 5. 
Both the decision to award attorney fees and the amount of such fees are within the sound 
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discretion of the trial court. See, Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836 (Utah App. 1991); Peterson 
v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305 (Utah App. 1991); Burtt v. Burtt, 59 Utah 457, 204 P. 91 (1922). 
Reasonableness is discretionary as well. Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305 (Utah App. 
1991); Openshaw v. Openshaw, 80 Utah 9, 12 P.2d 364 (1932). Further, an award for the 
expenses of prosecuting the suit is not restricted to those cases where the party receiving the 
award is destitute, but may be awarded in the trial court's discretion when the circumstances 
and fairness dictate. See, Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P.2d 1005 (1947). In this case, 
not only was the Plaintiff in need of the assistance, but the Defendant's actions were such that 
failure to grant attorney fees to the Plaintiff would have been inherently unfair. 
CONCLUSION 
The marriage in this case was one of long duration (38 years), the appellant has 
suffered serious health problems and is unable to work or otherwise provide for herself. To 
a large extent, Plaintiffs poor financial situation has been the fault of the Defendant due to 
his bad faith, unethical, and improper actions. The Defendant, on the other hand, is able to 
support himself and to contribute to support of the Plaintiff. Any difficulty in determining 
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Defendant's ability to meet his support obligation, real or imagined, has been due solely to 
his own actions. Plaintiff, therefore, asks this Court to uphold and affirm the judgment of 
the trial court in this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of May, 1993. 
£ 
Kathleen McConkie 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that on the v^ v^tWday of May, 1993,1 placed in the mail, postage prepaid, 
four copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to the following: 
Pete N. Vlahos 
VLAHOS, SHARP, WIGHT & BRADLEY 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ADA VEE MEDLIN, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : CIVIL NO. 924900335 
JAMES BYRON MEDLIN, : 
Defendant. : 
This matter came on regularly for trial on the 14th day of 
October, 1992, at the hour of 8:30 a.m. before the Honorable 
Leslie A. Lewis. Plaintiff was present in court and was 
represented by counsel, Kathleen McConkie. Defendant was 
present in court and represented himself, pro se. The Court 
heard testimony as to jurisdiction and grounds, and as to 
property allocation and alimony. The Court, having heard the 
testimony of the parties and other witnesses and argument of 
counsel for both parties, and having considered all of the 
evidence received at trial, and having considered plaintiff's 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
defendant's Objections, the Court now makes and enters its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
MEDLIN V. MEDLIN PAGE TWO FINDINGS St CONCLUSIONS 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that both parties are residents of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and have been for more than 
three months immediately prior to the commencement of this 
action. 
2. The Court finds that it has jurisdiction in this 
matter and that the waiting period has passed. 
3. The Court finds that the parties have been married 
since the 23rd day of June, 1954. 
4. The Court finds that irreconcilable differences have 
arisen in the marriage between the parties, making continuation 
of the marriage impossible, and that the plaintiff is entitled 
to a Decree of Divorce from the defendant on that basis. 
5. The Court finds that this is a long-term marriage (38 
years) and that the parties have no minor children; and that 
during the marriage plaintiff has raised the parries7 children, 
and run the parties7 home. 
6. The Court finds that the parties are both 61 years of 
age and that the plaintiff has a master's degree in speech 
pathology, and the defendant has a juris doctorate. 
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7. The Court finds that the plaintiff has not been 
regularly employed in a full-time capacity, out of the home, 
since early in the marriage, and has no licensure to teach, 
and that the defendant is a licensed lawyer, who has practiced 
law since 1957. 
8. The Court finds that the plaintiff worked full-time to 
put defendant through law school and that plaintiff has always 
been the primary caretaker of the parties7 children. 
9. The Court finds that the plaintiff used her master's 
degree in speech pathology and her creativity and business 
acumen to create and develop the Word Making Production 
business very early in the marriage, and that she has developed 
a new product for Word Making, as recently as 1991, while she 
was at home. 
10. The Court finds that plaintiff is largely responsible 
for the creation and development of Word Making Production, and 
that most of the products that comprise that business were 
strictly her creation. 
11. The Court finds that at present plaintiff is 
unemployed and is experiencing serious and significant health 
problems, most of which will exacerbate over time, these 
include but are not limited to, a severe hearing loss, a 
shorter right leg, right hip and ankle problems, a "crippled 
MEDLIN V. MEDLIN PAGE FOUR FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
foot", chronic sinus problems, cancer (double mastectomy), 
severe rheumatoid arthritis (affecting the feet, spine, neck, 
elbows and hands), some vision problems, memory loss, severe 
dental problems, respiratory problems, and ongoing problems 
with fatigue, severe pain and difficulty with sleeping. 
The Court bases this finding on the plaintiff's testimony, 
and the defendant's testimony that plaintiff has had "poor 
health from the beginning of the marriage'1, and on the Court's 
own observations concerning the plaintiff's appearance, 
demeanor, walk, and speech. The Court finds that plaintiff is 
severely impaired at this point and is unable to work at the 
present time. The Court further finds that these medical 
problems necessitate ongoing medical treatment, expenses and 
the taking of prescribed medication. 
12. The Court finds that defendant has testified to, and 
appears to be in, good health, with the exception of a minor 
hearing problem, and appears very able-bodied and capable of 
contributing to his own support and the support of plaintiff. 
13. The Court finds that defendant is either unable or 
unwilling to pay monthly alimony. 
14. The Court finds that plaintiff's reasonable monthly 
expenses are in excess of $2,160.33 per month (that figure does 
not include food), as set forth in Exhibit 50. 
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15. The Court finds the alimony award set forth herein 
will allow plaintiff to live close to the standard of living 
enjoyed by the plaintiff during the marriage. 
16. The Court finds the defendant has worked throughout 
the marriage, practicing law and has generated a significant 
but unknown amount of income from the practice. That, based 
upon the testimony, it is clear defendant has under-valued and 
misrepresented his law practice income. Defendant has 
marketable skills to earn a living and can use these to live a 
life close to the standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage. 
17. The Court finds that plaintiff needs assistance from 
the defendant in paying her attorney's fees; and that 
plaintiff's counsel, Ms. McConkie's, testimony supports the 
fees and costs as reasonable and necessary. The Court finds 
that at least 3 6 hours of counsel's time, at the rate of 
$115.00 an hour, was expended (through 8/31/92), and $40.00 an 
hour was billed for her paralegal, for a total of $9,112.79 in 
costs and fees and that Ms. McConkie's testimony as to her 
hourly rate and the reasonableness of the fees and their 
necessity was credible. The fees and costs as set forth in 
detail on Exhibit 51 are found to have been necessary. 
Additionally, the Court finds more time has been expended since 
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8/31/92 in hearings, trial preparation and trial, and Ms. 
McConkie is entitled to a reasonable fee for that as well. 
18. The Court finds, based upon the testimony of Mr. 
Topham and Mr. Duncan, that the marital home is valued at 
$162,000, and Word Making is valued at $75,000, and the 
defendant's law practice is valued at $35,000. 
19. The Court finds the defendant is not credible on 
valuing any of the above assets or as to his own income from 
the practice of law. 
20. The Court finds from all of the testimony, including 
defendant's, that the defendant has made significant income 
from the practice of law and has "commingled11 these finds with 
Word Making income and has consistently failed to fully reflect 
this income on tax returns and it cannot now be fully and 
accurately determined. 
21. The Court finds defendant will soon be eligible to 
earn social security benefits of $719.00 a month and has 
testified he may or may not retire. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ALIMONY: 
1. Plaintiff is entitled to permanent alimony based upon 
the length of the marriage, her health and inability to 
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generate income and the parties' standard of living during the 
marriage and the plaintiff's needs, and defendant's capacity to 
generate income. A permanent alimony award is needed to 
equalize the parties' respective standards of living. 
Therefore: 
A. Defendant's one-half share of the equity in the 
parties' home on Ksel Drive shall be awarded to plaintiff 
as permanent alimony. 
B. All royalty monies paid to Word Making 
Productions, Ltd. from the Pro Ed contract approximately 
($2,687.00 per quarter for an indeterminate time) shall 
also be awarded to plaintiff as alimony. 
C. Additionally, one dollar ($1.00) a year in 
permanent alimony is to be paid by defendant to plaintiff. 
D. Defendant is to provide documentation (tax 
returns and pay stubs) of his income on a yearly basis to 
plaintiff, due on or before May of each year. The 
plaintiff has the right to have alimony reviewed by the 
Court on an Order to Show Cause calendar if defendant's 
income increases substantially, such that alimony should be 
increased. 
HEALTH AND MEDICAL INSURANCE 
2. Defendant is to obtain and maintain health, accident, 
and dental insurance for the plaintiff for a period of three 
MEDLIN V. MEDLIN PAGE EIGHT FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
years* In the event that insurance coverage should not be 
sufficient to pay all expenses, plaintiff is responsible for 
all uncovered actual expenses and deductible expenses not 
covered by the insurance (including routine office visits). 
PROPERTY 
3. During the course of this marriage, the parties have 
acquired real property and an eighty percent (80%) interest in 
a business, Word Making Productions, as well as other 
personalty and realty. The Court finds that an equitable 
distribution of such assets should be as follows: 
A. The plaintiff should be awarded the following: 
(1) Half of the equity ($156,000) in the Sandy home 
on Ksel Drive (valued at $162,000) as part of her 
property distribution. 
(2) Household furnishings; in her possession with the 
exceptions set forrh herein. 
(3) One-half Golden Eagle contract. 
B. The defendant is awarded: 
(1) Word Making Productions, Ltd. 
(2) Law office business 
(3) Household property 
(4) Car 
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(5) Both IRA's 
IRA of Vee Medlin 
IRA of James Medlin 
(6) Vested Retirement Plan 
(7) Vested Keogh 
(8) One-half Golden Eagle Contract 
4. Defendant shall be awarded Word Making Productions, 
Ltd. along with the obligations associated therewith. The 
defendant agrees to hold plaintiff harmless from any and all 
liabilities associated with Word Making Productions, Ltd. and 
indemnify her thereto. 
5. The fair market value of the parties7 marital home, 
located at 2775 Ksel Drive, Sandy, Utah, was determined to be 
$162,000 with an approximate balance of $6,400 on the first 
mortgage. This home is awarded to the plaintiff as her sole 
and separate property, subject to her assuming the obligations 
for the first mortgage and holding the defendant harmless 
therefrom. Defendant shall quit-claim his interest in the 
marital residence on or before the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce. The plaintiff is awarded a one-half interest in the 
home as part of her share of marital property and she is 
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awarded defendant's one-half interest in the equity in the 
home, as part of the alimony award in this case. 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
6. During the course of this marriage, the parties have 
acquired items of personal property. The parties have 
heretofore effected a fair and equitable division of these 
items between them. Each of the parties should be awarded the 
household furniture and personal property now in their 
possession, except that the Court finds the defendant is 
entitled to the Italian Revival dining table and chairs, the 
grandfather clock, and walnut Chippendale secretary which were 
inherited from his mother. 
Defendant is to make arrangements to pick up the items of 
personal property in the possession of plaintiff on or before 
December 30, 1992, on a date certain, convenient and agreeable 
to both parties. If defendant does not pick up said property 
on that specified date, the plaintiff should have the right to 
dispose of that property as she sees fit. 
7. The defendant should be awarded the 1935 Honda CRX 
automobile and should assume the obligations associated 
therewith. 
DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
8. During the course of this marriage, the parties have 
incurred debts and obligations, both jointly and in their 
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separate names. The plaintiff should assume the first mortgage 
on the home located at 2775 E. Ksel Drive, Sandy, Utah, and 
hold the defendant harmless therefrom, in the approximate 
amount of $6,400 with a monthly payment of $416.66. The 
defendant should assume the payment of all back taxes on that 
said property, including but not limited to the taxes due for 
1992. The current tax in the amount of $2,209.16 is due and 
owing on or before November 30, 1992. Defendant should pay 
those taxes on or before that date. The delinquent taxes on 
the marital property are $2,252.77. Defendant should assume 
and pay said tax debt, as quickly as can be arranged and hold 
plaintiff harmless therefrom and indemnify her thereto. 
Specifically, the defendant should pay any and all debts or 
amounts due, associated with defendant's law practice, Word 
Making's retirement fund, the Visa obligation, as well as the 
debt, if any, to Ms. Nagasawa. The defendant should be 
responsible for all other marital debts of the parties. In 
addition, the defendant should specifically pay the $704.00 due 
and owing on the furnace repair, $3 50 for half of the furniture 
and personal property appraisal, and $450 which is the amount 
due on the appraisal on the marital home. 
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The defendant is responsible for any debts owed by Word 
Making Productions or obligations owed to Word Making 
Productions and/or to its retirement fund. 
9. Plaintiff has a right to and a Judgment should enter 
for all past due temporary alimony awarded in the amount of 
$15,000. Defendant should pay plaintiff the past due amount 
from the IRA accounts and/or the vested Keogh account. That 
amount should be paid on or before November 20, 1992. 
RETIREMENT INTERESTS 
10. The defendant is awarded all retirement funds accrued 
during the course of the parties' marriage, including vested 
Keogh plans, IRA's and vested retirement in Word Making 
Productions, Ltd. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
11. The defendant is ordered to pay all of plaintiff's 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in this action, which amount 
is due within ninety (90) days, but may be paid on a reasonable 
schedule, from the date of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, 
and a Judgment for the costs already incurred, set forth on the 
exhibit submitted to Court is entered. Defendant should pay 
fees and costs directly to plaintiff's counsel, Kathleen 
McConkie, 1200 Beneficial Life Tower, 36 S. State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111. Defendant is to make payment 
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arrangements with plaintiff's counsel within fourteen (14) days 
of this Decree. Plaintiff's counsel, Ms. McConkie, is to file 
a supplemental affidavit on fees within five (5) days of this 
Ruling. 
INJUNCTION 
12. The Court enjoins the defendant from contacting, 
attempting to visit or to harass the plaintiff in any fashion, 
or going on or near plaintiff's property without plaintiff's 
permission. Further, the Court enjoins both parties from 
making threats against the other or to counsel. 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISION 
13. Each of the parties should execute such deeds, 
contracts, agreements, or other conveyances as may be necessary G-tfff) 
to transfer the property awarded to the parties .7?/^ 7?%?$/\/(/-£ / 6 ~&] 
~72Pef&p£, & dated* C^£/£-/^vt LVith Hl€SC ^j^T^^ LoiiKh^ 6 d&Q 
1
 Dated this / day of December, 1992 ^ N v - ?<^\ ' 
LESLIE i^ "^ EEWrS- ' •> J 
DISTRICT \0URTJ.raUDG 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
to the following, this / day of December, 1992: 
Kathleen McConkie 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
36 S. State, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
James Byron Medlin 
Pro se 
2875 S. Main Street, Suite 201A 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3500 
1/TAJ 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann, § 30-3-3 (1989) 
(3) The court may order either party to pay to the clerk a sum of money for the separate 
support and maintenance of the adverse party and the children, and to enable such party to 
prosecute or defend the action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1991) 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for 
the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children and their support, 
maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of property and obligations for debts as 
is reasonable and necessary. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1992). 
3(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: . . . 
3(2)(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases including, but not 
limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, and 
paternity; . . . 
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